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INTRODUCTION 
Manuel Utset presents a new approach for thinking about corporate criminal sanction. He examines the effect of criminal sanction on 
corporate actors with time inconsistent ("TI") preferences and 
shows that traditional approaches to deterrence will under-deter these 
corporate actors. He concludes that "TI corporate actors-and thus 
corporations-will be systematically under-deterred by the sanctions that 
are optimal for TC actors [i.e., actors with time consistent preferences]." 1 
*Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. 
1 Manuel Utset, Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes and Time-Inconsistent 
Preferences, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 269 (20 13). 
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Modeling firms with TI preferences, Utset "shows that principals, 
gatekeepers, and regulators . . . will underinvest in monitoring and 
detection." To encourage the proper level of investment, he supports 
certain provisions in Sarbanes Oxley that "reduce[s] the immediate costs 
of compliance ... and reduce[s] the immediate rewards from violating the 
law."2 He also supports "commitment devices" found in the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
My contribution to Utset' s interesting and important research starts 
with three observations. First, the market economy places on TI corporate 
actors dynamic pressures that differ from those human actors face. For 
humans, punishments set at levels appropriate for actors with time 
consistent behavior (TC-ers) will not deter TI-ers. Human TI-ers will 
persist in their behavior, imposing (long run) costs on themselves and 
others-unless they are incarcerated for long periods of time, executed, or 
otherwise effectively deterred. 
In distinction to human beings, TI corporate actors face market 
pressures. Because TC-designed criminal sanctions under-deter them, they 
will commit more crimes and, ceteris paribus, face more sanctions. The 
corporate actors with TI preferences, therefore, face a competitive 
disadvantage relative to their competitors with TC preferences. Thus, 
unlike TI human actors, TI offenders' competitive disadvantages make 
"capital" punishment through acquisition or bankruptcy quite real. This 
possibility renders questionable the need for specially designed 
punishments for corporate actors with TI preferences. 
Second, market failure or inefficient agency/institutional structure, 
on one hand, and TI preferring behavior, on the other, is difficult to 
disentangle. Borrowing from Richard Posner's recent work on the 
financial debacle, 3 I argue that what appears to be TI preferring behavior 
may simply be behavior with TC preferences responding to market failure 
and/or sub-optimal institutional design. 
2 I d. at 8. 
3 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A F AlLURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF 
'08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
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Third, akratic tendencies4 in individuals often excuse or partially 
excuse in the criminal law applicable to human subjects. The most 
prominent example of these crimes is heat-of-passion murder. Such crimes 
are akratic acts because most people who do them do so under a 
momentary lapse in which they use an inconsistent discount to value the 
expected utility from killing a person, e.g., their spouse in flagrantes, 
against 20 years imprisonment. 5 Utset, on the other hand, argues for 
increasing punishment so as to deter the akratic actor-or at least creating 
different sorts of punishment to catch the akratic actor. 
I. TIME INCONSISTENT PREFERENCE, CRIMINAL SANCTION, AND 
AKRATIC CORPORATIONS 
Time inconsistent (TI) preferences emerge when one entity has 
different discount values for utility at different points in time. Time 
inconsistent preferences can be used to explain "akrasia," the ancient 
Greek term for momentary lack of control that leads one to act in a way 
that conflicts with his or her "better judgment" or "true" preferences-or 
at least those preferences the individual has most of the time. 
Addiction, typically characterized as akratic, arguably exemplifies 
TI preferences. Addicts persist in using drugs or alcohol even though they 
"know" such usage is bad for them. As they sometimes will say, addicts 
really "do not want to" to take drugs. In other words, most of the time, 
addicts value the benefits of soberness more than those of drug use. But, at 
moments of temptation, they value the utility from: (1) the high, buzz, and 
drunkenness at too low of a discount; and (2) staying clean and sober at 
too high of a discount. This renders the high/drunkenness of greater utility 
than soberness-at least for a brief time. At the moment at which the 
addict decides to takes drugs, the drugs offer greater utility than 
abstaining-thus the addict takes drugs. If, on the other hand, the actor 
discounted the value of the high and abstinence at the same rate, the actor 
4 George Ainslie uses the classical term "akratic" or weakness of the will to refer 
to hyperbolic discounting, which leads to time inconsistent preferences. See GEORGE 
AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 17 (200 1 ). 
5See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (LexisNexis, 5th ed. 
2009). 
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would have TC preferences-and would abstain. The value he places on 
his short term preferences would be consistent the value he places on his 
long-term values. 
Or, to use the example that Utset employs for much of the paper, 
consider the procrastinator. At the moment when he should choose to do 
something he should do, e.g., go to TurboTax and do his taxes, he prefers 
to play video games-even if he's due for a big tax return that year! In 
other words, the activity with the bigger payoff, doing your tax return and 
getting a few thousand bucks, has a felt lower utility-at least 
temporarily-than playing another round of Angry Birds because, well, 
Angry Birds is so enticing. Utset concludes that "this asymmetry between 
long-term and short-term impatience that leads people to procrastinate and 
overconsume." 
Criminal sanction, from an economic perspective, ensures that 
expected punishment exceeds any gain from criminal activity-thus 
making criminal activity undesirable from a rational perspective. 6 To use 
an example, although you might enjoy the $1,000 that you steal from your 
boss, you might find that option undesirable when you include the 
likelihood of sanction. What's $1,000 compared to 5 years in a state 
penitentiary? 
All criminal sanction creates a discounting problem. As Utset 
points out, there is always a "temporal gap between the time the offender 
commits a crime and the first possible moment in which she will 
experience the disutility from criminal sanctions .... [T]he benefits from 
misconduct are received (or the offender expects to receive them) before 
the time when she can be punished."7 
Utset is concerned that criminal punishment that is designed to 
make behavior undesirable for those with standard discount rates will fail 
to deter those with TC preferences. Utset identifies the following types of 
TI offenders: 
6 Richard A Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1193 (1985); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
7 Utset, supra note 1, at 27. 
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1. one shot TI offender who will engage once in TI preference, 
even though his long run welfare will be diminished; 8 
2. the nibbler who has long-range preferences to behave rationally 
but on occasion indulges TI preferences; 9 and 
3. the "compliance procrastinator" who procrastinates 
implementing action to reduce misconduct. 10 
His solution is to increase the "salience" of delayed sanctions. 
Utset identifies the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 certification process or 
high visibility IRS raids as methods to create greater salience. 11 He also 
suggests "targeting immediate benefits" by focusing on enforcement once 
a crime is detected, thus reducing immediate benefit. He also suggests 
reducing total benefits from misconduct and increasing the immediate 
costs of misconduct-which will also deter TI-ers. 12 Or, he suggests 
commitment devices-which he argues the Dodd-Frank Act creates. 13 
The following makes three arguments that suggest re-examining 
specially designed punishments for corporations with TI preferences. First, 
there is no "right" discount rate; firms compete on picking the right 
discount rate when making business investments. This competition applies 
to the selection of the appropriate rate for discounting the possibility of 
potential sanction. Because firms with TI-ers will ceteris paribus face 
greater punishment, they will be at a competitive disadvantage and thus 
suffer and perhaps in the long run cease to exist. In the long run, at least, 
TI-ers' competitive disadvantage thus might solve the problem Utset 
identifies without special sanctions. Second, what appears to be TI 
behavior may be quite rational TC behavior-but rational behavior 
working under market failure or institutions with inefficient agency 
structures. The solution should be market reform or reform in corporate 
8 I d. at 29-31. 
9 I d. at 31. 
w Id. 
11 I d. at 40-44. 
12 I d. at 44. 
13 Id. at 44-4 7. 
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governance, not criminal sanction. Third, we examine why criminal law 
for akratic behavior for individuals, i.e., heat-of-passion murder, acts as an 
excuse and how that insight affects Utset' s proposal for criminal law. 
II. DISCOUNT RATES AND THE COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE OF 
CORPORATIONS WITH Tl PREFERENCES 
As an initial matter, there is no "right" discount rate; firms (as well 
as individuals and nation states) in a sense compete on picking the "right" 
rate when making business investments-or in the case of individuals or 
nation-states, personal career choices or national macroeconomic policy, 
respectively. Because TI corporations will face more criminal sanctions 
than TC corporations, TI corporations will be at a competitive 
disadvantage. In the long run, this competitive disadvantage might work 
effectively to eliminate firms with TI-inconsistent preferences. 
Discount rates are predictions about future value-but, as Yogi 
Berra reminds us, it's tough to make predictions, especially about the 
future. Utset says, "people are impatient in that they prefer to receive 
benefits as early as possible and delay incurring costs until future 
periods." 14 But that is a problem only if your bank offers a high enough 
rate of return. If it's high enough, investment (and delay of gratifications) 
makes sense. A sufficiently high payoff for delay will overcome any finite 
preference for immediate gratification; if it is not high enough, immediate 
gratification may be preferable. 
In other words, there is no "correct" discount rate when people talk 
about the "cost of money," or the risk-adjusted value of money; these 
values merely reflect guesses as to future interest rates, economic growth, 
and returns on investment. Under certain rates of return, you will be better 
off in the long run saving at an advantageous rate of return. But, not if 
there is hyperinflation or a war-in which the potential, indeed, 
possibility, of a "long run" is quite diminished. "Eat, drink and be merry 
for tomorrow we die" is that utility maximizing strategy when we hear the 
sound of cannons. 
14 Id. at 12. 
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Second, markets, nations, and individuals compete on picking the 
correct discount rate-and only time can tell which discount value 
maximizes utility in the long run. For instance, some firms do not invest in 
the future and are so-called cash cows offering regular, high dividends; 
other firms invest and promise long-term increases in value. But, 
investment stocks are only desirable if the firm stumbles upon marketable 
technological or scientific advancement; otherwise, stick to Proctor & 
Gamble. 
Third, firms compete on the "correct" discount rate for criminal or 
other sanctions. As Utset points out, all criminal sanctions present a time 
inconsistency problem, as punishment follows the crime-and may or may 
not occur. 15 Firms must devote resources to avoid criminal and regulatory 
sanction. The correct amount of resources depends, of course, on the 
"correct" discount rate. But, as argued above, there is no "correct" rate; 
only guesses-guesses on which firms compete. 
Firms with TI preference will ceteris paribus face more criminal 
sanctions because the TI actor will commit more crimes. Utset recognizes 
this point: while "a TI actor will engage in misconduct at least the same 
number of times as her TC counterpart," such actor "may also engage in 
misconduct in instances when the TC actor is optimally deterred." 16 
Utset concludes that "[i]n a world with TC and TI corporate actors, 
it is impossible to rely solely on delayed sanctions to achieve optimal 
deterrence." 17 This is undoubtedly true in the short run. But, it may not be 
in the long run. If TI actors always must bear the costs of additional 
punishment due to law breaking, they will face a competitive 
disadvantage, perhaps leading to take-over, bankruptcy or some other type 
of corporate "capital punishment." 
15 I d. at 28. 
16 I d. at 52. 
17 Id. at 53. 
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Ill. AKRATIC CORPORATIONS OR MARKET FAILURE? 
In the long-run, or so the previous section argues, the market may 
correct for firms with TI-preferences by making them relatively worse 
compared to competitors. However, this hard laissez faire attitude seems 
to contradict reality. There are situations, as Utset points out, in which 
firms, in an endemic manner, appear to act upon TI preferences. Most 
prominent in our collective minds is, of course, the recent financial 
debacle in which major financial institutions appeared to value short-term 
gain over long-term disaster. 
But, even if many financial institutions behaved as if they had TI 
preferences, and Utset is probably right that they did so behave, one must 
still determine whether this corporate bad behavior resulted from TI 
preferences or flawed market or institutional structures. It is at least 
conceivable that flawed market or institutional structures created incorrect 
incentives that, in tum, made it rational, even when using TC discounting, 
to behave in ways that are destructive or inefficient in the long term. 
Disentangling TI preferences from the flawed market structures which 
create such preferences can be very difficult. 
In his analysis of the financial crisis, Judge Richard Posner 
identifies numerous instances of firms exchanging long-term benefit for 
short-term benefit. These firms assumed excessive risk and introduced 
systemic risk to the entire financial system. Posner, however, does not 
attribute this (in hindsight erroneous) behavior to irrationality or incorrect 
discounting. He defends the rationality of the highflying i-bankers. Rather, 
he points his finger at market, institutional, and regulatory failure. 
In particular, Posner argues that when interest rates are low, it is 
rational to engage in risky leveraging during a bubble-given the high 
profits to be made. He says: "The enormous returns that financial firms 
can make by borrowing heavily when interest rates are very low and 
lending into an expanding market provided a rational incentive for a firm 
to increase its leverage to a point at which bankruptcy was a 
non-negligible, though small, perceived risk." 18 Thus, given the promise 
of high returns, there is no irrational economic behavior-discounting or 
18 POSNER, supra note 3, at 88; id. ("Especially when interest rates are low, 
riding a bubble can be rational even though you know it's a bubble."). 
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otherwise-in preferring immediate payoff in exchange for risk of a much 
greater downside. 
Regulation failed to correct these skewed incentives and, in fact, 
encouraged greater risk, taking short-term gain at the expense of long-term 
risk. In particular, a federal bank deregulatory policy since the 1970s-
coupled with a policy to maintain federal deposit insurance-allowed non-
regulated banks to offer banking-like products and gave banks the 
incentives to take excess risk with their funds. Posner writes, 
Despite the bad experience with the S&Ls, 'safety first' 
regulation of commercial banks continued to be whittled 
down .... Brokerage firms and investment banks, such as 
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, which were not 
regulated as banks, along with other nonbank financial 
intermediaries such as finance companies, money market 
funds, and hedge funds, were increasingly permitted to 
offer financial products similar or even identical to those of 
banks .... But federal insurance of [banks'] demand 
deposits remained ... further encouraged risk taking. 19 
Securities law (and innovative securitization) also encouraged 
excessive risk-taking-as well as taking initial profits in the short term in 
exchange for a high risk of later catastrophe. Indeed, if one were a clever 
banker, one took the initial benefit and then "sold" the risk to another 
party-a practice that innovative finical instruments facilitates. Posner 
writes, "What made leverage even more dangerous for banks during the 
housing bubble was that rather than retaining the mortgages they had 
originated or bought, they sold most of them in exchange for securities 
backed by those mortgages ... [which] became a part of banks' equity 
capital."20 These securities, moreover, were incorrectly rated. Federal 
securities laws' reliance on rating agencies-a clear regulatory failure 
given that they are paid by those issuers whose securities they rate. 
19 POSNER, supra note 3, at 45-46. 
20 I d. at 48. 
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Further, the complexity and novelty of securities-and the 
derivatives based upon them-rendered their riskiness and value opaque 
even to the most sophisticated market participant. "The emergence of the 
organizational problems that I have mentioned coincided with the creation 
of the new financial instruments-the mortgage-backed securities and 
credit-default swaps .... Organizations stressed by rapid expansion were 
further stressed by the analytical challenges posed by the new 
instruments .... "21 
These problems suggest that actors, in fact, applied the proper 
discount given the market structure that they faced-a structure that 
rewarded short-term profit taking in exchange for long-term and systemic 
risk. To use an example, consider the investment banker who takes her 
short-term cash deposits but buys mortgage-backed securities, even 
though she knows there is a systemic risk to these securities. The returns 
are enormous, and the risk that she will lose money on any one deal is 
quite small. If her trades blow up in her face, she will not bear the majority 
of the losses: her employer, as well as markets at large, will. 
Under these conditions, it makes sense for the banker to value 
immediate gain over long-term well-being. The banker is acting rationally. 
And, the eventual collapse is not a failure of his discounting factor. It is 
arguably not flawed discounting-but regulatory failure. 
Punishing TI-inconsistent behavior could re-weigh this balance, 
correcting the incentives under which our trader works. But, criminal 
sanction as a remedy presents its own problems. Most of the market 
behavior Posner describes was perfectly legal. Thus, to correct it would 
require a significant expansion of the criminal law. Indeed, Utset sees the 
criminal law counteracting behavior that has been created or exacerbated 
by failed regulatory regimes. But, Utset' s approach seems roundabout, 
tending to add another layer of law to a complex regulatory structure, 
rather than simply fixing the regulation. 
21 Id. at81. 
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IV. AKRATIC CORPORATIONS OR INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE? 
One question that emerged from the financial crisis is how in the 
world did the entire banking industry allow the real estate bubble, and the 
practices built upon it, to persist? Or, to put the matter more practically, 
why didn't the principal at the bank at which our investment banker (the 
one discussed in the above example) worked stop this TI-preferring 
behavior before it bankrupted her firm? After all, the principals had the 
incentive to do so, as their interests were longer term compared to their 
employees. Their interests were allied with their bank's long-term success, 
not merely their annual bonuses. 
Utset would, I think, argue that TI-preferences, both by the actors 
and those principals and managers entrusted to create monitoring regimes, 
are to blame. It was simply too easy to either take the quick money or 
procrastinate in putting in enforcement mechanisms?2 The corporations 
acted akratically. 
Posner presents an alternate view. He identifies poor compensation 
schemes as part of the problem. He writes: 
The tendency of corporate management to cling to a bubble 
and hope for the best-or, equivalently, the tendency to 
maximize short-run profits-is strengthened if, as on Wall 
Street during the boom, executive compensation is both 
very generous and truncated on the downside. For then 
every day that you stay in you make a lot money, and you 
know that when the bubble bursts you'll be okay because 
you have negotiated a generous severance package with 
your board of directors?3 
Further, banking firms' structure-and banking firms' ability or 
lack of ability to attribute profit-encourages banking management to 
undervalue risk management and overvalue input from successful, often 
risky, traders. Posner writes, "a financial firm will tend to give more 
22 Utset, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
23 POSNER, supra note 3, at 93. 
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weight to the views of successful traders than to those of risk managers," 24 
given that traders' contributions to the bottom line are clear and easily 
attributable. The financial industry's rapid expansion in the early 2000s 
exacerbated firms' monitoring costs because "an organization expands 
rapidly [and] there is bound to be some loss of control over subordinates, 
which exacerbates the problem of having a less experienced staff."25 
Posner identifies institutional causes for risky, apparently risky TI 
behavior. Disentangling flawed institutional structure from flawed 
incentives and preferences is a chicken and egg problem-just like 
disentangling flawed market structures from flawed incentives and 
preferences. Given this interdependence, perhaps the most efficient fix 
would be to correct the regulation of institutions as opposed to expanding 
the criminal law given the latter's costly and often unwieldy enforcement 
costs. 
V. Tl PREFERENCES, MORAL JUDGMENT, AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
In general, the criminal law treats actors with TI preferences with 
lenity or, at the very least, does not single them out for special, extra 
deterrence. For instance, heat-of-passion murder is arguably an akratic act. 
As classically described, the husband sees his wife and her paramour in 
flagrante. Overcome by an uncontrollable and totally unexpected anger, he 
kills his wife and her paramour. He regrets his act immediately; he did not 
"want" to do it. Rather, he-at the moment he came upon his wife-had a 
TI preference to kill her, or so one might argue. 
The law does not specially deter the heat-of-passion murderer. To 
the contrary, our cuckold receives a lighter sentence than murder (at least 
under the classic, unreformed version of heat-of-passion murder)?6 
Analogously, partial diminishment, the "uncontrollable impulse" test in 
24 I d. at 80. 
2s Id. 
26 D. Barret Broussard, Comment, Principles for Passion Killing: An 
Evolutionary Solution to Principles for Passion Killing: An Evolutionary Solution to 
Manslaughter Mitigation, 62 EMORY L.J. 179, 201 (20 12). 
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insanity, and even the drunkenness defense in specific intent crimes can be 
viewed as lenient treatment for those acting from TI preferences. 
These crimes, which are arguably caused by the defendant's TI-
preferences, suggest that as a moral matter, we are lenient towards actors 
acting on the basis of TI-preferences. The criminal law is apparently 
interested in judging the "whole" person-not fleeting preferences. 
Indeed, beyond pure moral arguments, some have suggested that the 
excuse or partial excuse of crimes proceeding from TI-preferences reflects 
the higher cost of deterring such crimes on the individual level-
suggesting that it is efficient to have weaker penalties and thus less 
deterrence. 27 
Utset, however, goes in the opposite direction. Rather than excuse 
or partially excuse the actor acting from TI preferences-thus lowering 
deterrence, he advocates specially designed laws specifically targeted to 
deter such actors. To those who argue for a morality-based approach to 
criminal law, this move needs further justification. Those who defend 
heat-of-passion murder usually argue that certain circumstances try even 
the best of people-and that it is unfair to hold individuals to the standards 
of the criminal law at all times?8 It is a concession towards or recognition 
of human frailty. The question for Utset is why do we not also recognize 
corporate frailty? Or, why should we only recognize human frailty? 
CONCLUSION 
Building on an import series of works, Utset is exammmg an 
important new approach to the examination of the criminal law. Given the 
apparent pervasiveness of extremely bad decision making throughout 
financial markets during the last decade, his re-examination of the basic 
assumptions of criminal corporate sanction seems essential. Taking into 
account corporate behavior that proceeds from TI-preferences seems an 
important step in this re-examination and points to a valuable set of 
insights that can be brought to legal reform. 
27 Adam Candeub, An Economic Theory of Criminal Excuse, 50 B.C. L. REv. 87 
(2009). 
28 Id. at 124 n.232. 
